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ABSTRACT: Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the 
framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the 
satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that 
what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, 
which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an 
improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have argued that they 
face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article 
introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. 
Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a 
consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the 
agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim 
is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of 
preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long 
interested behavioral economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’ 
 
Introduction 
Joe has arrived for lunch at Carolyn’s Cafeteria. Carolyn, the owner of the cafeteria, has displayed 
several options for her customers. Joe is hungry and only has enough money to purchase either a 
slice of cake or a piece of fruit. What is the best option for Joe? Many would be inclined to affirm 
that the healthy option is best for Joe, independent of Joe’s subjective attitudes, including his 
desires or preferences. However, according to revealed preference theory, the canonical theory of 
microeconomists, whatever Joe prefers is the best option for Joe. On this account, the satisfaction 
of Joe’s revealed preference makes Joe better off, whether any such option is actually healthy or 
unhealthy.  
Behavioral welfare economists have long questioned the satisfaction of revealed 
preferences as the normative foundation of welfare economics. Given what they have discovered 
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about human psychology over the last several decades, including the endowment effect, the role 
of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it 
would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of 
choice. Experiments have consistently shown that, for a variety of reasons, agents do not possess 
stable context-independent revealed preferences.  
In response, many behavioral economists have suggested that what makes agents better off 
is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘latent’ or ‘true’ preferences, which may not 
always be observed through choice.1 These preferences can ‘float free’ of choice.2 While such 
authentic or genuine preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, 
some philosophers of economics have argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, 
normative, and methodological challenges.3 
This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that 
blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner 
that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, 
faffective, and stable for the agent who has one.4 To have such a plan and to act on it is to adopt a 
particular kind of strategy when confronted with choice situations. Agents who choose according 
to their plans are resolute choosers.5 My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply 
to every choice situation, this kind of true preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about 
classic choice situations that have long interested behavioral economists and philosophers of 
economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’ 
The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections consider latent or true preferences 
and elaborate on the Joe-in-the-cafeteria example. Sections 3, 4, and 5 wrestle with value 
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commitments, values-based preferences, and resolute choice. Section 6 considers challenges to 
values-based preferences and Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. Joe-in-the-Cafeteria 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein begin their book Nudge with an example, ‘The Cafeteria’.6 
Carolyn, the Director of Food Services for a large city school system, makes decisions that can 
affect the diets of thousands of children. Carolyn has learned that by changing her food displays, 
she can increase or decrease the consumption of healthy and unhealthy food items. How should 
Carolyn arrange her cafeterias? Thaler and Sunstein consider various possibilities, from arranging 
foods to maximize profits to arranging them at random, but they argue that Carolyn should arrange 
the food to make the students best off, all things considered. More specifically, Carolyn should use 
her position to ‘nudge’ people towards making choices that improve their own welfare as judged 
by their own subjective standards.7 
While nudges are central to behavioral economics, this article draws no conclusions 
regarding them, including their efficacy or ethical permissibility.8 Instead, this article focuses on 
the prior question: what makes some option, rather than another, better for some agent, such as 
your average Joe? After all, if Carolyn is to follow Thaler and Sunstein’s advice in arranging the 
options so that consumers are made better off as judged by their own standards, then she will need 
an account of welfare or well-being for Joe, a fallible person whose choices are influenced by 
various psychological and contextual factors. 
The received view, revealed preference theory, states that if Joe chooses some option x, 
when he might have chosen option y instead, then option x is revealed to be preferred to option y. 
Joe’s choices are consistent if they satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences, which requires 
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that, if x is revealed to be preferred to y, then y must not be revealed to be preferred to x.9 On this 
account, the best option for Joe is the one that he chooses.10  
Behavioral economists have long rejected this view, however. The voluminous empirical 
evidence contests the thesis that agents always make considered judgments of their own welfare.11 
Given what behavioral economists have learned about human psychology over the last several 
decades, including the endowment effect, the focusing illusion, and the framing effect, most agree 
that it would be a mistake to accept observed choice as the normative foundation of their 
discipline.12 In many cases, agents are systematically affected by factors that have little or no effect 
on their welfare, interests, or goals. In all such cases, revealed preferences are unstable and context-
dependent and, therefore, preferences revealed through choice cannot serve as the normative 
foundation of behavioral welfare economics.  
What then might serve as the welfare criterion for behavioral economics? Most behavioral 
economists subscribe to the view that the average Joe’s ‘latent’ or ‘true’ preferences should serve 
this role.13 Unlike revealed preferences, true preferences may not be revealed through choice. 
Sometimes, true preferences have been defined subjunctively – as the preferences that Joe would 
have acted upon, had he not been subject to the distorting psychological effects discovered by 
behavioral economists. They have also been defined non-subjunctively, as Joe’s ‘authentic’ or 
‘genuine’ preferences that may not be revealed through choice. Either way, the problem is that 
Joe’s choices can be distorted by psychological factors, such as limited attention, inferior cognitive 
abilities, or lack of self-control. These factors can operate against the satisfaction of Joe’s true 
preferences. Consequently, behavioral economists have opted to treat such choices as ‘errors’ that 
can be corrected with an intervention, such as a nudge or boost.14 
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While true preferences might appear to be a prima facie significant improvement over 
revealed preferences, some scholars have raised epistemological, normative and methodological 
concerns over such preferences, arguing that the average Joe’s true preferences should not serve 
as the normative foundation of behavioral welfare economics.15 I will consider each of these 
challenges in Section 6. First, however, I will extend the ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria’ example and 
introduce a new kind of non-subjunctive true preference, values-based preferences, that can 
respond to these challenges. 
 
2. Setting the Stage  
Suppose that behavioral economists are correct to claim that Joe’s revealed preference for cake or 
fruit is unstable and context-dependent. Which option does Joe ‘truly’ prefer? What is Joe’s true 
preference? Daniel M. Hausman invites the reader to suppose ex hypothesi that the average Joe is 
‘generally concerned’ about his health and appearance, and that he deeply regrets his occasional 
sugar binges.16 Hausman interprets health and appearance as mattering more to Joe than the mere 
pleasure that would be yielded by his consuming unhealthy options. In this example, Joe is 
supposed to have a true preference for fruit over cake. 
Infante et al. disagree, however. They extend Hausman’s example by suggesting that while 
Joe insists health and appearance matter to him, life’s small pleasures, such as eating unhealthy 
options, matter too.17 Joe thinks resoluteness is a virtue but he also thinks there is a place in life 
for acting spontaneously. If we suppose that Joe has a standing resolution to eat healthily, he also 
must decide whether any particular choice point is an occasion for resoluteness or spontaneity. In 
other words, Joe must weigh the various considerations at hand and determine his overall 
preference, which Infante et al. claim is to assume Joe has an ‘inner rational agent.’ Moreover, this 
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weighing operation will be influenced by contextual cues. For instance, we should expect that 
Joe’s judgement about the relative importance of different dimensions of his life will depend on 
what Joe happens to be attending to at any particular time and place. When the cake is displayed 
prominently, after he weighs various considerations, Joe-in-the-cafeteria is more likely to choose 
the cake when confronted with a choice between cake and fruit. However, Joe-in-front-of-the-
mirror, who is attending to his wasteline, may deeply regret having chosen the cake. Infante et al. 
argue persuasively that if Hausman’s argument for Joe’s true preference is to apply to this case – 
of Joe-in-the-cafeteria versus Joe-in-front-of-the-mirror – then it must be obvious that Joe-in-the-
cafeteria reasons erroneously and that Joe-outside-the-context-of-choice is the author of Joe’s true 
preference. 
This article follows the same line of inquiry by extending this example. However, rather 
than supposing that Joe possesses a perfectly rational inner agent, I will assume that Joe has the 
‘normal’ human capacity to deliberate over his consumption choices in the context of a particular 
choice and outside the context of choice. I will argue that, when confronted with a choice between 
a healthy and unhealthy option, there are ways for Joe to reason erroneously. First, however, 
something more substantive needs to be said about what it means for Joe to be ‘generally 
concerned’ with his own health. 
 
3. Value Commitment & Values-Based Preferences 
We are supposing that Joe is ‘generally concerned’ with consuming in a manner that promotes his 
own health. Joe is not simply concerned with making one healthy choice between a slice of cake 
and a piece of fruit at a specific time and place. Rather, Joe is concerned with making many 
successive healthy choices over time such that his actions jointly constitute a healthy pattern or 
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plan of consumption. What does it mean for Joe to be ‘generally concerned’ with his own health? 
One way to make this idea clear and distinct is to suggest that Joe is committed to the value of his 
own health. 
Following Valerie Tiberius, I will suppose that a value commitment is normative, affective, 
and stable for the person who has one. Joe has a pro-attitude towards his own health, which leaves 
him in a positive affective state.18 Health, for Joe, is a personal normative commitment that he is 
motivated to pursue.19 Joe’s value commitment is not a fleeting phenomenon, but is 
psychologically real, and it possesses diachronic stability across disparate choice contexts. This 
commitment, for Joe, is different from any mere whim, fancy, or preference, all of which can 
involve fleeting pro-attitudes. Given this relative stability, Joe does not need to deliberate about 
the significance of his own health in every choice situation, but he accepts it as a matter of course.20 
The value of his health is a relatively fixed point in Joe’s deliberations, and it serves as the basis 
for planning and actions. Significantly, Joe’s value commitment is also justified in the sense that 
he takes himself to have good reasons to be committed to his own health. Upon reflection, he 
approves of his pro-attitude towards his health and is aware of no circumstances such that his 
attitudes would become unstable in response to reflecting on them. 
Joe’s value commitment serves as a means for him to assess how his life is going. There is 
something good about his own healthy state, and his value commitment has an authority that guides 
his specific choices and actions. As will be detailed in Section 5 below, when Joe acts on a 
consumption plan that is grounded by his value commitment, his actions – his choices over time – 
express what I term his values-based preferences. A values-based preference is a kind of non-
subjunctive true or genuine preference grounded by a value commitment, which makes the 
preference normative, affective, and relatively stable for the agent who has one. While values-
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based preferences follow a venerable philosophical tradition that insists on a tight connection 
between values and preferences, values-based preferences cannot be completely understood in 
terms of preferences alone.21 Whereas preferences are typically construed as subjective 
comparative evaluations that may generate no reasons for action, a value commitment that grounds 
a values-based preference is a robust pro-attitude that generates reasons for action.22, 23 As Daniel 
M. Haybron and Valerie Tiberius state, “to value something and not merely prefer it is to see it as 
generating reasons for you—as tending to justify responding in certain ways to it and limiting how 
you might reasonably respond to it.”24 While values-based preferences may not be revealed 
through choice, and might be described as a subset of second-order or meta-preferences, they can 
never be explained as mere subjective comparative evaluations. Invariably, values-based 
preferences are rooted in something that is psychologically real – a value commitment. 
To be clear, my claim is not that satisfying Joe’s values-based preferences constitutes Joe’s 
well-being or that every value commitment Joe has must bear on his well-being.25 Given Joe’s 
prudential value commitment to his own health, along with the assumption that Joe is informed of 
the relevant facts about healthy patterns of consumption (from nutrition science, etc.), then we can 
reasonably suppose that, other things being equal, Joe’s healthy state is positively related to his 
well-being. Health, for Joe, is a prima facie good. For the purpose of this article, it will suffice to 
presume an evidentiary relation between the satisfaction of Joe’s prudential values-based 
preferences and his well-being, which means that, without making any claims about what 
constitutes Joe’s well-being, the satisfaction of Joe’s values-based preferences is evidence for 





4. Resolute Choice 
It is one thing for Joe to report that he is committed to the value of his own health and that he forms 
the intention to follow through on a healthy pattern of consumption, but it is quite another for him 
to act on this value commitment over time. Joe is confronted with a dynamic choice problem – a 
series of choices that might not serve his concerns well even though each choice in the series at 
the time of choice seems perfectly well suited to serving his concerns.27  
While philosophers and others have proposed various ways to resolve dynamic choice 
problems, this article focuses on one strategy – resolute choice – that was originally developed by 
Edward F. McClennen and further refined by David Gauthier.28, 29 On this account, Joe is 
confronted with a choice among various consumption plans. Every plan specifies a complete 
implementable sequence of consumption choices over time.30 On the assumption that Joe is 
properly informed of the alternatives and exercises good judgement, how is Joe to choose a plan? 
Joe compares and evaluates the prospects or expected outcomes of each plan and judges such 
outcomes to be either acceptable or unacceptable. In this case, we will assume that acceptable 
consumption plans are compatible with Joe’s value commitment to his own health while 
unacceptable plans are not.31 Other things being equal, Joe’s commitment picks out acceptable 
patterns of consumption, healthy patterns, from those that are not (unhealthy patterns). During the 
deliberative process of selecting a particular plan or set of acceptable plans, Joe evaluates the 
terminal states of affairs associated with feasible consumption plans and his evaluation is based on 
an interval measure defined on these states (a utility function or expected utility function).32 
For Joe, acting on an acceptable plan requires adopting a strategy for consuming goods and 
services over time. McClennen and Gauthier identify three distinct strategies available to Joe: (1) 
myopic (2) sophisticated and (3) resolute choice. Joe chooses myopically when he embarks on a 
10 
 
plan but executes another plan that seems best to him at the time of choice, without any 
consideration as to the likelihood that his choice will continue to seem best to him in the future. 
By contrast, if Joe manages to look ahead and consider what will be best for him in the future, then 
he is a sophisticated chooser. For example, he might decide to reject a presently attractive plan, 
when he predicts that he will come to prefer the prospect of an alternative plan. Finally, Joe might 
opt to be a resolute chooser. This mode of choice subordinates posterior choices to prior choices. 
Joe chooses an acceptable plan at the outset, commits to it, and holds to this plan rather than 
considering later on what would be the most attractive option to choose.  
So, which strategy should Joe pursue? Should Joe be myopic, sophisticated, or resolute? 
The conditions under which resolute choice is rationally feasible has been subject to much debate, 
but for the purpose of this article, I will set this debate to the side and consider an example of a 
situation where resolute choice is preferable to sophisticated and myopic choice. McClennen 
proposes a condition of ‘intrapersonal optimality’ on the rationality of resolute choice: agents 
should choose resolutely in cases where there are benefits to both the present self and the future 
self that will have to be forgone if one does not act resolutely.33  
Consider an example – Joe. Joe is committed to the value of his own health. He is just 
about to enter Carolyn’s cafeteria and he is also aware that he will have to make a choice between 
healthy and unhealthy options when he arrives. Given his value commitment, Joe prefers the 
healthy option over the unhealthy option, everything considered. However, Joe also knows that, at 
the time of choice, he will be tempted, and may ultimately choose the unhealthy option. Joe is 
moments away from entering the cafeteria and he truly wants to choose the healthy option. What 
should Joe do? Which strategy should he choose? 
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If Joe is a myopic chooser, then, with sufficient temptation, Joe will abandon his plan to 
choose the healthy option and, at the time of choice, he will choose the unhealthy option instead. 
If Joe is a properly sophisticated chooser, then he will realize at the outset that he is likely to change 
his evaluation of his prospects at the time of choice. With this information, Joe concludes that 
choosing a plan at the outset and sticking to it – without taking further action – is infeasible for a 
person like him. Resorting to a sophisticated strategy, Joe proceeds to drink a liter of water before 
entering the cafeteria, believing that, while drinking the water will cause discomfort, it will also 
reduce his dehydration, the main cause of his cravings for the unhealthy options. With this strategy 
in place, Joe is able to follow through on his original plan – to ultimately select the healthy option 
over the unhealthy one. Alternatively, Joe could be a resolute chooser. Joe chooses his acceptable 
plan at the outset – a plan that is compatible with his value commitment – and despite his change 
in evaluation of the prospects when confronted with a choice between healthy and unhealthy 
options, he resolves to follow through on his original plan.34 Again, what should Joe do? 
Joe should be resolute. Why? One need only compare the consequences of Joe being 
resolute with those of his being sophisticated. Sophisticated and resolute Joe both choose the 
healthy option. However, sophisticated Joe faces the cost of drinking a large quantity of water 
before entering the cafeteria. We might reasonably assume that in evaluating his situation, both 
before entering the cafeteria and afterwards, Joe prefers going to the cafeteria without the need for 
consuming a large quantity of water in advance. After all, doing this makes Joe rather 
uncomfortable. If that is right, and Joe is resolute, then he considers himself better off than he 
would be were he sophisticated, since he plans to choose the healthy option without the need to 
drink water in advance, and he also considers himself better-off at the time of choice because even 
though he does not seek to realize what he then considers his best prospect, he nevertheless knows 
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that he is making a choice that is not his best prospect. His sophisticated counterpart, on the other 
hand, would have made the healthy choice, but suffered some discomfort. This example shows 
that, for Joe, resolute choice is a superior strategy to sophisticated choice. Choosing resolutely is 
intra-personally optimal. Without choosing in this way, Joe must either suffer physical discomfort 
or abandon his value commitment.  
While it should be clear that value commitments are inessential to resoluteness, Joe is our 
focus and he has a value commitment to his own health. If he chooses according to a healthy 
pattern of consumption, then he is a resolute chooser. When Joe acts on his plan, which is grounded 
in his value commitment, his choices are compatible with his value commitment and express his 
values-based preferences. Quite simply, if Joe’s choices are incompatible with his value 
commitment, then Joe’s choices do not express his values-based preferences.  
 
5. Joe, the Impossible Stoic? 
So far, the argument has concerned the rationale and feasibility of Joe attending to values-based 
preferences in welfare assessments. I have argued that, given Joe’s value commitment, resolute 
choice is a superior to myopic and sophisticated choice. However, this conclusion poses a new 
problem. If Joe is committed to the value of his own health and chooses resolutely, it might appear 
that he must never waver – that Joe must never choose unhealthy options. Is Joe really an 
impossible Stoic?  
This section considers how Joe might successfully navigate between his values-based and 
non-values based preferences. There are at least three circumstances under which Joe, who is 
committed to the value of his own health, is justified in choosing unhealthy options: (1) while 
remaining committed to his original plan; (2) after abandoning his original plan; and (3) while 
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temporarily deviating from his plan (where competing considerations temporarily outweigh 
health). Otherwise, making unhealthy choices are, for Joe, errors by his own subjective standards. 
Given that Joe can justifiably choose some unhealthy options while remaining committed to the 
value of his own health, the following analysis reveals that behavioral economists and others risk 
overemphasizing the normative significance of satisfying Joe’s true preferences. There are special 
circumstances when Joe does less well by his own subjective standards when his values-based 
preferences are satisfied. 
a. Remaining Committed to One’s Plan 
Joe’s healthy pattern of consumption does not necessarily entail that he must choose the healthy 
option at every choice point. While Joe’s commitment to his own health requires that he chooses 
a pattern of consumption that is, overall, compatible with his value commitment, this leaves open 
the possibility that Joe can choose some unhealthy options without deviating from his original 
plan, which is grounded in his value commitment. Unless Joe’s selected pattern of consumption 
only contains healthy options, which is possible, but unlikely, then Joe’s healthy pattern of 
consumption can contain some unhealthy options. Within Joe’s healthy pattern of consumption, 
Joe will have a ‘budget’ for making some unhealthy choices. 
Suppose, for example, that Joe’s consumption plan consists of 100 successive choice 
points. For every choice point Joe must make a decision between consuming a healthy and 
unhealthy option. Suppose further that Joe chooses 99 healthy options, and 1 unhealthy option. 
Given that Joe chooses the healthy option 99% of the time, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
Joe’s pattern of consumption is healthy. Of course, for every additional unhealthy option that Joe 
chooses, the more reasonable it becomes to characterize Joe’s pattern of consumption as 
‘unhealthy.’ In any case, unless Joe’s plan calls for only healthy options, then it can accommodate 
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some unhealthy options. Built into Joe’s plan is a budget for choosing some quantity of unhealthy 
options. So long as Joe has not exceeded his budget, Joe can choose unhealthy options and these 
actions are compatible with his plan and his value commitment that undergirds it. 
Whether Joe’s pattern of consumption is healthy or unhealthy will depend on any number 
of facts, including facts about Joe’s physiology, genetics, and his level of physical activity. There 
are bound to be borderline cases that make it difficult to judge whether Joe’s pattern of 
consumption is healthy or unhealthy. It would be striking to learn that, if Joe chooses 49 unhealthy 
options and 51 healthy options, then his pattern of consumption is healthy, but when he chooses 
49 healthy options and 51 unhealthy options, then his pattern of consumption is unhealthy. This 
suggests that there may be no satisfactory hard and fast rule for deciding when, precisely, Joe’s 
plan has become incompatible with his value commitment in the same way that there is no clear 
rule for deciding whether Joe is bald. In any case, I will set this issue aside for this purpose of this 
article. My only claim here is that, given Joe’s plan of consumption, he need not always choose 
the healthy option over the unhealthy option. Unless Joe’s plan contains no unhealthy choices, 
then Joe can be a resolute chooser and choose some unhealthy options. Joe enacting his healthy 
pattern of consumption does not preclude him choosing some unhealthy options. 
b. Abandoning One’s Plan 
Until now, I have supposed ex hypothesi that Joe is committed to the value of his own health. But, 
of course, nothing stops Joe from deliberating once again, after his original deliberation, and 
reaching a different conclusion regarding his value commitments and plan of consumption. As 
Tiberius states, “in a deeply reflective moment, one might decide that one no longer has reason to 
value something one once valued. This is compatible with thinking that when one has a 
commitment to the value of some end, ordinary instances of practical reasoning are constrained by 
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that value”.35 Clearly, Joe can reconsider his value commitments at any time (although if Joe never 
ceases to reconsider his value commitments, then one might reasonably question his commitment). 
If Joe deliberates and decides to abandon his value commitment, then it would be mistaken to insist 
that he must continue consuming according to his original plan. If it turns out that Joe no longer 
cares about pursuing his healthy pattern of consumption, or even feels hostile towards the 
possibility of choosing healthy options, then it would be a weakness of resolute choice if it required 
that Joe must stick to his original healthy pattern of consumption no matter what. 
c. Temporarily Deviating from One’s Plan 
There is third way that Resolute Joe is justified in choosing unhealthy options while remaining 
committed to the value of his own health. Suppose that, for every choice point Joe confronts, he 
chooses the healthy option because he sticks to his plan. However, while Joe is committed to the 
value of his own health, he also values spontaneity. When Joe is out on the town celebrating with 
friends or attending a wedding, he occasionally chooses unhealthy options. One way to make sense 
of this is to suggest that the preferences Joe occasionally manifests in the presence of unhealthy 
options are local departures from his normal plan of consumption. If Joe occasionally chooses the 
unhealthy option when his plan calls for no unhealthy choices, then Joe does not act resolutely. 
However, Joe cannot be said to completely abandon his value commitment and plan either. Instead, 
Joe temporarily blocks the application of his plan in a context of particular choice situations. 
How are we to make sense of this case? If Joe has a standing resolution to consume the 
healthy option at every choice point, but he also, on occasion, strongly prefers the unhealthy 
option, must Joe invariably act on his original plan? At any given choice point, how is Joe to decide 
whether it is an occasion for resoluteness or spontaneity? To answer this question, I will adapt 
Gauthier’s analysis and apply it to the example of Joe-in-the-cafeteria.36 
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Let us first distinguish between Joe’s values-based preferences that he acknowledges when 
choice is not imminent from his proximate preferences that Joe sometimes acknowledges when he 
is confronted with a choice between healthy and unhealthy options. At any given time, Joe may 
want to act on his proximate preferences (choose the unhealthy option), but he does not want to 
act at other times on what would then be his proximate preferences, because they are in conflict 
with his (all-things-considered) values-based preferences. Joe understands that if, given his 
proximate preferences, he chooses the action that best realizes his immediate concerns, then he is 
deliberating in a way that is incompatible with his plan, which is the best realization of his overall 
concerns, as viewed at that time or at any other time. 
Suppose, again, that Joe’s plan consists of 100 choice points. At each choice point, he must 
choose between a slice of cake (unhealthy option) and a piece of fruit (healthy option). Suppose 
that when a particular choice is imminent, Joe prefers a slice of cake this time but a piece of fruit 
on all other occasions. When no choice is imminent, Joe prefers fruit on every occasion. Suppose 
also that when choice is not imminent Joe prefers 100 pieces of fruit to 100 slices of cake. If Joe 
chooses based on his proximate preferences, then taking all of his choices into account, Joe will 
choose slices of cake on each of the 100 occasions. This mode of choice does not best realize Joe’s 
concerns as viewed at any time because were Joe to choose on the basis of his values-based 
preferences, Joe would choose 100 pieces of fruit, and whether or not a choice is imminent, Joe 
prefers 100 pieces of fruit to 100 slices of cake. 
This example presumes that Joe has two bases of deliberation: Joe’s proximate preferences 
at the time of choice and Joe’s preferences at a time when no choice is imminent. If Joe deliberates 
on the basis of his proximate preferences, then he does less well in realizing his preferences, as 
they are at any time. Joe would have done better if he had deliberated on the basis of his values-
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based preferences. If Joe evaluates the prospects that would be realized from consistent choices 
based on his proximate preferences and compares the prospects to those that would be realized 
from consistent choices based on his values-based preferences, Joe would conclude that the former 
plan is less favorable than the latter plan. If Joe deliberates on the basis of his proximate 
preferences, he will do less well in realizing his preferences overall, as they are at any time, than 
he would have done if he deliberated on the basis of his values-based preferences removed from 
the context of choice. Joe would be irrational to deliberate on the basis of his proximate 
preferences. 
So far, I have supposed that Joe always evaluates the prospects of choices consistently 
based on his values-based preferences more favorably. But, what if Joe finds himself in the thralls 
of a particular choice situation, and there is some unhealthy option available to him that 
overwhelms everything else, including Joe’s ordinary evaluation of prospects? In this case, we can 
suppose that Joe judges that the benefits of satisfying his proximate preference outweighs the costs 
of sacrificing his values-based preference. 
Joe can recognize in the strength of his proximate preferences what Gauthier refers to as a 
threshold of immediacy.37 A proximate preference below this threshold is such that at the time of 
choice between some healthy and unhealthy options, Joe would choose not to act on this 
preference, if it entailed that Joe must therefore act on all proximate preferences of equal strength. 
A proximate preference above the threshold is one that, at the time of choice, Joe would choose to 
act on all proximate preferences of equal strength.  
The main point here is that if Joe deliberates on the basis of his proximate preferences 
below his threshold, he will do less well in realizing his values-based preferences, not only as he 
views them in the context of a particular choice situation, but as he views them at any time, than 
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were Joe to deliberate on the basis of preferences removed from the time of choice, and proximate 
preferences above the threshold. It would be irrational for Joe to deliberate on the basis of his 
proximate preference when they are insufficiently strong to cross Joe’s threshold of immediacy. 
However, by the same reasoning, it would be rational for Joe to deliberate based on his proximate 
preferences (to act against his value commitment) when they are sufficiently strong to cross the 
threshold. 
 
6. Values-Based Preferences and the Methodological, Normative, and 
Epistemological Challenges 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, true preferences have been criticized on epistemological, normative 
and methodological grounds. What are these challenges and how do values-based preferences 
stand up to them? The epistemological challenge states that, even if people had true preferences, 
it remains unclear how behavioral economists could know about them. After all, unlike revealed 
preferences, true preferences may not be revealed through choice. The epistemological challenge 
is independent of the account of values-based preferences developed in this article. While the 
burden of inferring values-based preferences falls on the shoulders of behavioral economists who 
wish to design interventions that nudge or boost people towards the satisfaction of such 
preferences, that project is a separate issue. With that being said, if Joe in-the-cafeteria has a true 
preference for a healthy pattern of consumption that is difficult to infer, this state of affairs only 
makes it all the more urgent for behavioral economists to focus on developing reliable methods 
for inferring them. On the assumption that some people, such as Joe, really do have values-based 
preferences, then the epistemological challenge should be overcome, not used as a reason to claim 
that people do not or cannot have such preferences. While values-based preferences are more 
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difficult to infer (and measure) than revealed or behavioral preferences (because choices can float 
free of values-based preferences), this observation alone is hardly a reason to ignore them. 
Nor is the empirical basis of latent or true preferences always controversial. Infante et al. 
acknowledge that, in some retail markets, where competing suppliers offer the same product priced 
according to different tariffs, it seems reasonable to assume consumers have a true preference for 
paying less rather than more, even when consumers choose the more expensive option.38 In cases 
like this, representing choices as mistakes or errors defined relative to true preferences for low 
prices is a reasonable assumption to make when modelling individual choice. In this kind of case, 
one might insist that the options have an objective ranking, in inverse order of their prices that is 
independent of the consumer’s subjective judgements. 
Another potential strategy for inferring true preferences, suggested by Hausman, would 
involve conducting experiments. In the case of choosing between fruit and cake, one might place 
both items in equally prominent positions, and advertise an equal amount of nutritional information 
for each option.39 Under these settings, if most agents without any impairments to deliberation 
choose the cake over the fruit, then this would be evidence for claiming that cake is the option 
latently preferred by of most agents.40  
Most promising perhaps are the relatively new methods, developed by behavioral 
economists, for inferring true preferences when choices are unobservable and likely to reflect 
errors.41 While the details of these methods are beyond the scope of this article, they have been 
used to infer preferences that would have been observed from well-informed and deliberated 
choice data. As such, these methods go a long way to blunt the epistemological challenge, and 
there is no good reason to think that some variation of this methodology could not be used to infer 
values-based preferences, specifically. 
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The normative challenge is a worry about whether some agent, such as a government or 
policy-maker, is ever justified to nudge others towards the satisfaction of their true preference. The 
central concern here is that some such interventions may fail to respect people and their actual 
choices. As Hausman describes, it seems that Infante et al. “object to a normative economics that 
imposes the economist’s or policy-maker’s judgment of what is good for people rather than simply 
furthering their choices – or that they object to a normative economics that does this while 
pretending to conform to people’s preferences”.42 First, there is no pretending to conform to 
people’s values-based preferences. Either individuals, such as Joe-in-the-cafeteria, have values-
based preferences or they do not. Second, it should be clear that the main objective of this article 
has been to defend an account of true preferences that can serve as the criterion of choice for a 
class of cases initially popularized by Thaler and Sunstein and further developed by others.43 
Beyond this objective, many questions remain, of course, including those regarding the 
permissibility and efficaciousness of interventions designed to promote any preferences. While 
such questions are central to behavioral economics, they are peripheral to the argument defended 
in this article. 
It is worth recognizing that the normative challenge is not a special problem for true 
preferences, including values-based preferences. Furthering the revealed preferences or choices of 
individuals might be problematic as well. Consider an intervention designed by behavioral 
economists to benefit some individuals by furthering their choices, which may not promote their 
own well-being. It remains an open question whether helping someone satisfy a revealed 
preference for an endless supply of addictive drugs could ever be justified. Other things being 
equal, helping to satisfy this problematic preference would seem to be bad for the individual. 
Promoting the satisfaction of preferences, whether revealed or true, is never a value-neutral 
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decision. Invariably, interventions that promote the satisfaction of some preferences over others 
face some version of the normative challenge. 
Finally, the methodological challenge states there is no psychological foundation for 
ascribing agents with stable and context-independent true preferences. Responding to this 
challenge requires either arguing that there is no need for such a foundation, or that there may be 
an adequate psychological foundation for true preferences. Following the latter pathway, Hausman 
has argued that your average Joe-in-the-cafeteria has the capacity for context-independent 
reasoning, and that he himself can affirm or dispute the existence of his true preferences.44 But 
Infante et al. reject this line of reasoning by insisting on the context-dependent nature of revealed 
preferences and claiming that there appears to be no scientifically defensible way to identify 
features of human psychology that represent true objectives and distinguish them from features 
that can be classified as reasoning flaws. 
While it has been widely documented by behavioral economists that revealed preferences 
are context-dependent and unstable, values-based preferences are not. As discussed in Section 4, 
the value commitments that ground values-based preferences are psychologically real, which 
makes them a potential candidate for serving as the basis for true preferences.45 Moreover, they 
are relatively stable because they are reflectively endorsed (reflective equilibrium). The agent who 
possesses values-based preferences is committed to a value that stabilizes these preferences across 
disparate contexts of choice, even if there are circumstances when the agent fails to act on their 
true preference. It is critical to recognize that to claim values-based preferences are stable across 
relevant contexts is not to claim that such preferences, and the value commitments that undergird 
them, never change.46 As described in the previous section, agents can always reevaluate their 
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value commitments. However, possessing a genuine value commitment entails that one’s 
commitments are a relatively fixed point in deliberations about how to act or what to choose. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Values-based preferences redirect one’s attention from individual consumption choices to whole 
patterns of consumption. What matters for a person such as Joe, who is committed to the value of 
his own health, is not that he makes one or two healthy choices, but that he chooses over time in a 
manner that expresses his value commitment, which is normative, affective, and stable.  
The foregoing analysis reveals significant lessons for behavioral economists and 
philosophers of economics. From the purview of values-based preferences, behavioral economists 
risk overemphasizing the normative significance of true preferences. There are circumstances 
when agents would do less well – by their own subjective standards – to satisfy their values-based 
preference than to satisfy some particularly strong (proximate) preference that the agent possesses 
in a specific choice situation. This result complicates the project of designing and deploying 
interventions, such as nudges and boosts. After all, even if such interventions were ethical and 
efficacious, and behavioral economists had knowledge of Joe’s values-based preferences, they 
would still have to decide whether, for any given choice point, they should intervene to ensure Joe 
chooses the healthy option (Joe’s value commitment is compatible with choosing some unhealthy 
options). 
For philosophers of economics it should be clear that the three – epistemological, 
normative and methodological – challenges do not paralyze latent or true preferences. On the 
contrary, this article has argued that one kind of true preferences, values-based preferences, go a 
long way to blunt these challenges. 
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Finally, one might object to values-based preferences by arguing that they only apply to a 
narrow range of choice situations and, therefore, are of limited value. Indeed, there should be no 
doubt that these preferences only apply to choice situations characterized by an agent, such as Joe, 
with a value commitment. One might describe such cases as self-acknowledged self-control 
problems.47 While values-based preferences may not apply to every case, they do provide a 
rigorous framework for thinking about a class of choice situations that is ubiquitous to behavioral 
economics and, therefore, ought to be taken seriously. 
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